Hukum Labur amp Berniaga Forex (Forex Trading) Zaharuddin Abd Rahman Saya ingin minta pihak ustaz untuk menerangkan tentang pelaburan tukaran matawang asing dan juga perniagaan Forex. Bagaimana pula jika saya melakukan transaksi sendiri dengan berbekalkan analítico sendiri atau yang disediakan oleh corredor dengan melayari internet. Kemudian memperolehi untung dari jualan dan belian matawang asing ini. Terima kasih Bagi menjawab soalan ini, y un peru memahami dua jenis perkara iaitu: - 1 - Melabur wang ringgit y un dalam satu syarikat yang memperolehi untung melalui FOREX. 2- La plataforma de satén de Melantik atau syarikat untuk menjalankan jual beli wang asing dan simpan. Semua transaksi dijalankan oleh anda sendiri, syarikat hanya menyediakan plataforma de mengambil upah perkhidmatan sahaja. Pertama. Hukum bagi melabur dentro Syarikat yang FOREX menjalankan: Forex (Foreign Exchange) atau yang Lebih dikenal dengan Perdagangan Mata Wang Asing Ia merupakan Suatu jenis Perdagangan / transaksi yang memperdagangkan matawang Suatu negara terhadap matawang negara lainnya yang melibatkan Pasar-Pasar matawang utama di dunia Selama 24 Mermelada secara berterusan. Benar, memang FOREX matawang adalah diharuskan, tetapi keharusannya tertakluk kepada sejauh maná ia menurut garis panduan yang dikeluarkan dari hadith Nabi yang sohih. Iaitu: - a - Ditukar (serah dan terima) dalam waktu yang sama ia disebut dalam hadis sebagai yadan bi yadin. Dalam bahasa Inggerisnya adalah sobre la base del terreno. Ia datang banyak ha sido antara yang paling utama adalah:. . . . . . . . . Ertinya. Emas dengan Emas (ditukar atau diniagakan). Perak dengan Perak, Gandum dengan Gandum, Tamar dengan Tamar, el garam dengan Garam mestilah sama timbangan dan sukatannya, dan ditukar secara Terus (pada masa satu) jenis dan sekiranya berlainan, maka berjual-belilah kamu sebagaimana yang disukai (Riwayat musulmana, hay 4039 sin Hadices 11/9). B - Nabi bersabda: - Ertinya. Sesungguhnya Rasulullah s. a.w berkata. Pertukaran Antara perak dan emas adalah Riba kecuali jika ia dilakukan serentak secara (sera, terima dentro de satu masa) (Riwayat musulmana, hay 1586, 3/1209) c - Manakala pembelian secara Hutang dari Salah satu Antara Dua pihak adalah haram berdasarkan hadis: - Ertinya . Rasulullah a través de la melancolía de los dioses en el perak secara berhutang (Riwayat al-Bujari, no 2070, 2/762) Hadis-hadis di atas menyebut perhal displin islam dalam pertukaran emas dan perak. (Billete de banco) juga adalá sama displinnya dengan emas perak disebabkankan nilai dan fungsinya sebagai medio de intercambio. Sinónimos (Español) para "Transatlántico" es accesible para poder reproducir en el idioma original. Demikian keputusan Majlis Fiqh Antrabangsa dan juga Majlis Kewangan Islam Antarabangsa di bawah AAOIFI. FOREX dentro matawang yang diuruskan oleh Syarikat konvensional sudah pasti tidak Akan menjaga syarat ini kerana kebanyakan FOREX yang dijalankan oleh institusi Konvensional adalah lsquoForward de divisas Forex atau yang menggunakan lsquoValue hacia adelante (je de calificación masa hadapan) tergolong yang dentro de Riba Nasiah. Mereka juga kerap menggunakan SWAP, Opciones de lain-lain instrumento yang tidak halal di sisi Shariah. Instrumen-instrumen tadi tidak memenuhi syarat Islam iaitu serah terima atau disebut qabadh dalam Islam secara benar hakiki atau hukmi pada waktu yang sama. Masalah dalam implementasi FOREX adalá bertangguh dalam penyerahan dari kedua-dua pihak. Tatkala itu aqad menjadi batal (Radd al-Muhtar ala ad-durr, 4/531). Clasificación no saya nafikan, bahawa terdapat sesetengah Institusi Kewangan Islam yang melakukan divisas ini setelah mendapatkan kelulusan Majlis Penasihat Sharia mereka, Namun semua mereka hanya terlibat dentro de FOREX jenis SPOT dan bukannya jenis lsquoForward jika adapun jenis hacia adelante ia menggunakan konsep Al-WAD atau unilateral Promise dan ia Telah disepakati keharusannya. Apa yang pasti, Majlis La shariah merece un buque y un buque en el buque secara bebas begitu sahaja. Justeru MELABUR MÓVAL (BEERTI ANDA MELABUR DAN KEMUDIAN TUNGGU UNTUNG SAHAJA) dan dalam institusi kewangan konvensional yang memperolehi untung melalui cara FOREX adalá tidak halal di sisi Islam. Ia adalah keputusan Panel Penasihat Shariah dunia yang bernaung di bawah nama Auditoría y Auditoría Organización para las instituciones islámicas (AAOIFI). Antara panel penasihat Shariahnya adalá Syeikh Mufti Taqi Uthmani, Prof. Dr. Syeikh Wahbah Zuhayli, Prof. Dr. Syeikh Siddiq Dharir, Syeikh Abdullah al-Mani, Dr. Abd Sattar Abu Ghuddah, Syeikh Dr. Nazih Hammad, Syeikh Dr. Hussain Hamid Hassan, Syeikh Nizam Yaquby, Dr. Mohd Daud Bakar, Syeikh Al-Ayashi al-Sadiq Faddad, Syeikh Dr. Ajil Nashmi dan ramai lagi. KEDUA. Hukum las operaciones de cambio de yang dijalankan sendiri - Bagi mengetahui hukum bagi bentuk Kedua ini, Pertama-tamanya ia tertakluk kepada: - a - Terdapat unsur judi atau tidak apabila membeli dan menjual matawnag hanya kerana mengharap keuntungan dari perbezaaan nilainya. Bukan kerana digunapakai de negara matawang terbabit. Maka setah kajian perinci oleh JAKIM dan ISRA, mendapati unsur judai adalah wujud maka semua jenis forex trading adalah HARAM. B - Kesohihan dan kewibawaan plataforma de syarikat dari sudut lesennya dan pengenalannya. Ia diperlukan bagi mengelak y un ditipu oleh plataforma syarikat yang tidak sebenar. Butiran terperinci berkenaan plataforma ini mestilah diteliti dan boleh diperolehi. Jika tidak, transaksi y una adalah syubhat dari awal lagi keran terdapat unsur gharar. B - Plataforma de Jika tersebut punyai wibawa dan lessen serta información yang sangat mencukupi, perkara kedua adalah menilai akta-akata berkaiatan dengan aktiviti ini dari badan berwajib di Malaysia. Ini perlu bagi memastikan y un tidak terlibat dengan aktiviti menyalahi undang-undang Negara. Jika yang kedua juga lulus, saya kira transaksi jual matawang asing dan simpan dan kemudian jual semula apabila harga tukarannya naik adala harus kerana secara automatiknya dilaksanakan menurut kaedah lsquospot. Namun mari kita sama-sama cuba mehami dan menyemak bagaimana proses ini dilakukan secar ringkas dan melihat pandangan Islam tentangnya. Setakat apa yang diterangkan oleh persona yang terlibat dan yang tahu berkenaan cara forex trading memlali internet ini. Ia seperti berikut: - 1) Ia mempunyai modal mínimo. Sebagai contoh USD 1, USD 100 por lain-lain, entre otros productos por el comercio de divisas masing-masing. 2) Dengan modal itu, plataforma del syarikat del pihak forex que negocia en el akan membukakan satu akaun khas buat peserta. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,. Gambaran mudahnya adalah: - Katalah modalnya USD 100 yang dibeli dengan tukaran semasa hari tersebut USD 1 RM 3.6, dan dibuka kaunter lsquoselling melalui plataforma syarikat tersebut. Sebagai Contoh, pada ESOK harinya apabila dilakukan analisa terhadap pegerakan je de calificación matawang, didapati je de calificación USD mengukuh berbanding Ringgit iaitu USD 1 RM 4 Tatkala UIT, ia Akan botón menekan jual USD 100 Dan memperolehi RM 400. Ini bermakna ia telah beroleh keuntungan sebanyak RM berbanding 40 Harga belian asalnya tadi Pihak Syarikat FOREX ini MESTILAH Seluruh memasukkan RM 400 UIT sebaik Sahaja transaksi jual beli dilakukan, TIDAK DIBENARKAN DILEWATKAN UALT DIMASUKKAN SEBAHAGIAN SAHAJA, jika dentro Contoh di atas, hanya RM 40 dimasukkan, manakala Baki modal sebanyak RM 360 hanya Akan dimasukkan sejurus peserta menutup akaun pada Hari tersebut. Isu Shariah. Jika ini tidak berlaku, el maka ia lulus dari sudut Shariah, el nombre de jika kelewatan berlaku, isl Shariah di sini adalah berlaku penangguhan dalam penyerahan matawang ringgit. Ini menjadikan ia bercangah dengan arahan Nabi s. a.w: - Dalam menukar wang dengan wang, Nabi y otros niños panduan yang mesti dipatuhi iaitu: Ertinya. Sesungguhnya Rasulullah s. a.w berkata. Pertukaran Antara perak dan emas adalah Riba kecuali jika ia serentak secara dilakukan (sera, terima dentro de satu masa) (Riwayat musulmana, hay 1586, 3/1209) Manakala pembelian secara Hutang dari Salah satu Antara Dua pihak adalah haram berdasarkan hadis: - Ertinya. Profeta vio melarang dari menjual emas dan perak secara berhutang (Riwayat Al-Bujari, hay 2070, 2/762) Imam An-Nawawi telah menyebut dengan Terang bahawa párrafo ulemas telah bersepakat wajibnya syarat sera, terima dentro de satu masa atau lsquoTaqabud Samada secara Hakiki (fizikal ) (Syarah Sohih Muslim) Cadangan. (Ataque a la izquierda) (Syarah Sohih Muslim) Cadangan. Mesti dipastikan bahawa sinasa transkasi jual beli dilakukan, kesemua modal dicampur untung dimasukkan de dalam akaun kita tanpa sebarang tangguh, secara automatik juga kita boleh mengeluarkan wang tersebut tanpa sebarang halangan. 3) Terdapat syarikat yang mensyaratkan mínimo modal yang tinggi seperti USD 1000 dan lain-lain jumlah. Untuk itu menakaran apa yang dinamakan apalancamiento yangmana modal peserta akan digandakan. Sebagai contoh, katalah modal sebenar y un adalah USD 100. Maka anda dikehendaki recuerdo atau secara pilihan memlih gandaan yang dikehendaki. Seperti 1. 10 modalidad de la cerveza modal y un akan digandakan kepada 10 kali menjadi USD 1000 atau jika memilih 1: 100, modalidad de la cerveza anda menjadi USD 10000. Dengan jumlah baru inilah matawang anda akan di pasarkan di pasaran. El uso de diversos instrumentos financieros o de capital prestado, como el margen, para aumentar el potencial de retorno de una inversión. El apalancamiento se puede crear a través de opciones, futuros, margen y otros instrumentos financieros. Por ejemplo, digamos que tiene 1.000 para invertir. Esta cantidad podría invertirse en 10 acciones de Microsoft, pero para aumentar el apalancamiento, podría invertir los 1.000 en cinco contratos de opciones. Entonces usted controlaría 500 acciones en lugar de sólo 10. (Rujukan) Jika benarlah apa yang saya gambarkan ini, transaksi forex menggunakan Leverage ini adalah HARAM kerana ia dikira menjual matawang yang tidak di dalam milik anda. Milik sebenar y una hanyalah USD 100 tetapi yang dijual adalah 10,000. Ia berdasarkan apa yang disebut oleh Nabi s. a.w. Ertinya. Janganlah kamu menjual sesuatu Yang di tidak dentro milikmu (Riwayat Abu Daud, 3504, 3/283) Malah saya juga hampir pasti, Wang Yang digandakan oleh Syarikat UIT dikira sebagai Pemberian pinjaman dan sudah tentu mereka Akan mengambil sedikit keuntungan Samada diketahui atau tidak diketahui Oleer peserta. Jika ini berlaku, sekali lagi riba telah berlaku. Bagi mengelakkan perkara yang ditegah oleh Islam dari berlaku di sini, penggunaan apalancamiento 1: 1 sahaja yang dibenarkan. Wallahualam. 4) Diberitakan juga pihak syarikat menasihatkan pescado de agar de frutas y hortalizas frescas de 30 sandalias de frutas sin semillas de comercio dijalankan. Dan jika terdapat masala kemungkinan rugi atau apa yang dinamakan margen de llamada, pihak peserta dibenarkan untuk membuka kaunter satu lagi samada jual atau beli bagi menyeimbangkan kemungkinan rugi. Pandangan. Wallahualam, jika semunya dilaksanakan dengan jelas perangangan yang betul. Setakat ini saya tidak nampak adanya masala Shariah dalam tindakan ini KECUALI IA MEMPUNYAI ELEMN PERJUDIANO YANG JELAS kerana membeli nilai matawang untuk dijual apabila nilainya naik sedangkan ia BUKAN KOMODITI. Wallahualam. Walaupun berniaga sendiri divisas dan memenuhi syarat ini ADALAH HARAM kerana sebab utamanya adalah JUDI, tambahan pula sesuatu ia bukanlah yang disukai oleh polisi y economía di dentro de Islam, pertamanya kerana menurut pandangan y economía dentro de un Islam, medio matawang adalah de intercambio Sahaja dan ia bukanlah komoditi yang Wajar Diniagakan bagi memperolehi untung dari perbezaan nilainya. Kita Tahu je de calificación matwang Kini tidak Lagi bersandarkan emas atau Perak, Wang Kertas hari ini (dinero fiduciario) Clasificación no mempunyai je de calificación tersendiri (seperti Logam emas dan Perak) kecuali nilainya datang dari pasaran yang mundial ditentukan la demanda y la oferta oleh di pasaran Dunia. Justeru, menjadikan cara ini bagi miembro anak dan isteri makan bukanlah satú bentuk kerjaya yang terpuji di dalam Islam. Malah es una organización que se dedica al sistema sistemático y al sistema de gestión de recursos humanos. Justeru, fikirkanlah. Jika Anda tidak Ingin menerima padnagan saya, tidak mengapa tetapi bacalah pendapat ulemas besar kewangan Islam Sedunia iaitu Syeikh Mufti Taqi Uthmani dentro de un hal ini: comercio de divisas Forex Por Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani Publicado: 11 Zul Qadah 1424, 22 de Noviembre de 2007 P.) es el Forex Moneda Trading halal He adjuntado un documento detallando los aspectos de la empresa. A.) Revisé los papeles enviados por usted. Yo soy de la opinión que estas transacciones no son conformes con Shariah. La condición misma de que usted no puede tomar la entrega de la moneda comprada hace que sea inadmisible. Además, existen otros elementos que, según mi conocimiento, hacen que este comercio sea ilícito en la sharia, como las ventas a plazo, las ventas a corto plazo, etc. Esto se suma al hecho de que las monedas son originalmente un medio de intercambio y sólo deberían cambiarse por Uso personal en diferentes países. Hacerlos una mercancía comerciable solamente para ganar un beneficio es también contra la filosofía básica de la economía islámica. Por lo tanto, no le aconsejo que se entregue a este comercio. Sila Buka Sumber. Forex Trading Adakah y un menje siapa Syeikh Mufti Taqi Uthmani, silka buka di sini untuk mengenalinya. Zaharuddin Abd Rahman 28 Zulhijjah 1428 p / s. Semua pemain forex, no dan jawpaan saya inin adalah jawapan yang dipermudah agar ia boleh difahami orang awam. Jika terdapat kesilapan teknik carajual dan beli, boleh dimaklumakn kepada di ruangan komentar kerana información sobre el tatuaje de los atas jugas y el terciopelo. Syaa tiada masa untuk membuat pembacaan dan kajian sendiri di ketika ini. Sekian Añadir esta página a su favorito Social Bookmarking sitios web More. Islamic Forex Trading ISLAMIC FOREX TRADING 1. Los Contratos de Cambio Básico Hay un consenso general entre los juristas islámicos en la opinión de que las monedas de diferentes países pueden ser intercambiados sobre una base de punto a una tasa Diferente de la unidad, ya que las monedas de los diferentes países son entidades distintas con diferentes valores o valor intrínseco y poder adquisitivo. También parece haber un acuerdo general entre la mayoría de los estudiosos sobre la opinión de que el intercambio de divisas a plazo no es permisible, es decir, cuando los derechos y obligaciones de ambas partes se refieren a una fecha futura. Sin embargo, existe una considerable diferencia de opinión entre los juristas cuando los derechos de cualquiera de las partes, que son iguales a las obligaciones de la contraparte, se aplazan a una fecha futura. Para elaborar, consideremos el ejemplo de dos individuos A y B que pertenecen a dos países diferentes, India y Estados Unidos respectivamente. A tiene la intención de vender rupias indias y comprar dólares estadounidenses. Lo contrario es cierto para B. El tipo de cambio rupia-dólar acordado es 1:20 y la transacción implica la compra y venta de 50. La primera situación es que A hace un pago al contado de Rs1000 a B y acepta el pago de 50 de B. La transacción se liquida sobre una base spot desde ambos extremos. Tales transacciones son válidas e islámicamente admisibles. No hay dos opiniones sobre el mismo. La segunda posibilidad es que la liquidación de la transacción de ambos extremos se difiera a una fecha futura, digamos después de seis meses a partir de ahora. Esto implica que tanto A como B harán y aceptarán el pago de Rs1000 o 50, según sea el caso, después de seis meses. La opinión predominante es que tal contrato no es islámicamente permisible. Una opinión minoritaria la considera admisible. El tercer escenario es que la transacción está parcialmente liquidada desde un solo extremo. Por ejemplo, A hace un pago de Rs1000 ahora a B en lugar de una promesa de B para pagar 50 a él después de seis meses. Alternativamente, A acepta 50 ahora de B y promete pagar Rs1000 a él después de seis meses. Existen opiniones diametralmente opuestas sobre la admisibilidad de tales contratos que equivalen a bai-salam en monedas. El propósito de este trabajo es presentar un análisis exhaustivo de varios argumentos en apoyo y en contra de la permisibilidad de estos contratos básicos que involucran monedas. La primera forma de contratación que implica el intercambio de contravalores sobre una base de punto es más allá de cualquier tipo de controversia. La admisibilidad o no del segundo tipo de contrato en el que se remite la entrega de uno de los contravalores a una fecha futura se discute generalmente en el marco de la prohibición riba. En consecuencia, discutimos este contrato detalladamente en la sección 2 que trata de la cuestión de la prohibición de riba. La admisibilidad de la tercera forma de contrato en la que la entrega de ambos contravalores es diferida, se discute generalmente en el marco de la reducción del riesgo y la incertidumbre o gharar involucrados en tales contratos. Este es, por lo tanto, el tema central de la sección 3 que trata de la cuestión de gharar. Sección 4 intentos de una visión holística de la Sharia se refiere a cuestiones como también la importancia económica de las formas básicas de contratación en el mercado de divisas. 2. La cuestión de la prohibición de Riba La divergencia de puntos de vista1 sobre la permisibilidad o no de los contratos de cambio en monedas se puede atribuir principalmente a la cuestión de la prohibición riba. La necesidad de eliminar riba en todas las formas de contratos de cambio es de suma importancia. Riba en su contexto sharia se define generalmente2 como una ganancia ilegal derivada de la desigualdad cuantitativa de los contravalores en cualquier transacción que pretenda efectuar el intercambio de dos o más especies (anwa), que pertenecen al mismo género (jins) y se rigen por La misma causa eficiente (illa). Riba se clasifica generalmente en riba al-fadl (exceso) y riba al-nasia (aplazamiento) que denotan una ventaja ilegal por exceso o aplazamiento respectivamente. La prohibición de la primera se logra estipulando que la tasa de intercambio entre los objetos es unidad y que ninguna ganancia es permisible a ninguna de las partes. Este último tipo de riba se prohíbe al no permitir la liquidación diferida y asegurarse de que la transacción sea liquidada in situ por ambas partes. Otra forma de riba se denomina riba al-jahiliyya o riba pre-islámica que surge cuando el prestamista pide al prestatario en la fecha de vencimiento si este último liquidará la deuda o aumentará la misma. El aumento se acompaña de cobrar intereses sobre la cantidad inicialmente prestada. La prohibición de riba en el intercambio de monedas que pertenecen a diferentes países requiere un proceso de analogía (qiyas). Y en cualquier ejercicio de analogía (qiyas), la causa eficiente (illa) desempeña un papel extremadamente importante. Es una causa eficiente común (illa), que conecta el objeto de la analogía con su sujeto, en el ejercicio del razonamiento analógico. La causa eficiente apropiada (illa) en caso de contratos de intercambio ha sido variadamente definida por las principales escuelas de Fiqh. Esta diferencia se refleja en el razonamiento análogo para las monedas de papel pertenecientes a diferentes países. Una cuestión de considerable importancia en el proceso del razonamiento análogo se relaciona con la comparación entre monedas de papel con oro y plata. En los primeros días del Islam, el oro y la plata cumplían todas las funciones del dinero (thaman). Las monedas se hicieron de oro y plata con un valor intrínseco conocido (cuánto de oro o plata contenido en ellos). Estas monedas se describen como thaman haqiqi, o naqdain en la literatura Fiqh. Estos eran universalmente aceptables como principal medio de intercambio, lo que representa una gran parte de las transacciones. Muchas otras mercancías, tales como varios metales inferiores, también sirvieron como medio de intercambio, pero con aceptabilidad limitada. Estos son descritos como fals en la literatura Fiqh. Estos también se conocen como thaman istalahi debido al hecho de que su aceptabilidad no se deriva de su valor intrínseco, sino debido al estatus concedido por la sociedad durante un período de tiempo particular. Las anteriores dos formas de monedas han sido tratadas de manera muy diferente por los primeros juristas islámicos desde el punto de vista de la admisibilidad de los contratos que los implican. La cuestión que debe resolverse es si las monedas de papel de la presente era de la categoría anterior o de la segunda. Un punto de vista es que estos deben ser tratados a la par con thaman haqiqi o oro y plata, ya que estos sirven como el principal medio de intercambio y unidad de cuenta como este último. Por lo tanto, por razonamiento análogo, todas las normas relacionadas con la Sharia y los mandamientos aplicables a thaman haqiqi también deben aplicarse al papel moneda. El intercambio de thaman haqiqi se conoce como bai-sarf, y por lo tanto, las transacciones en monedas de papel deben ser gobernadas por las reglas de Sharia relevantes para bai-sarf. La opinión contraria sostiene que las monedas de papel deben ser tratadas de manera similar a fals o thaman istalahi debido al hecho de que su valor nominal es diferente de su valor intrínseco. Su aceptabilidad se deriva de su estatus legal dentro del país nacional o de su importancia económica global (como en el caso de dólares de los Estados Unidos, por ejemplo). 2.1. Una síntesis de puntos de vista alternativos 2.1.1. La prohibición de riba se basa en la tradición de que el santo profeta (la paz y las bendiciones de Allah sean con él) dijo: "Oro para oro, plata para plata, trigo para trigo, cebada para cebada, fecha para la fecha, Sal para la sal, en las mismas cantidades en el lugar y cuando las mercancías son diferentes, vender como le convenga, pero en el lugar. Así, la prohibición de riba se aplica principalmente a los dos metales preciosos (oro y plata) y otros cuatro Materias primas (trigo, cebada, dátiles y sal). También se aplica, por analogía (qiyas) a todas las especies que son gobernadas por la misma causa eficiente (illa) o que pertenecen a cualquiera de los géneros de los seis objetos citados en la tradición. Sin embargo, no hay un acuerdo general entre las diversas escuelas de Fiqh e incluso los académicos pertenecientes a la misma escuela en la definición e identificación de causa eficiente (illa) de riba. Para los Hanafis, la causa eficiente (illa) de riba tiene dos dimensiones: los artículos intercambiados pertenecen al mismo género (jins), estos poseen peso (wazan) o mensurabilidad (kiliyya). Si en un intercambio dado, ambos elementos de causa eficiente (illa) están presentes, es decir, los contravalores intercambiados pertenecen al mismo género (jins) y son todos pesables o todos medibles, entonces ninguna ganancia es permisible (el tipo de cambio debe Ser igual a la unidad) y el intercambio debe ser sobre una base de punto. En el caso del oro y la plata, los dos elementos de la causa eficiente (illa) son: unidad de género (jins) y peso. Ésta es también la opinión de Hanbali según una versión3. (Una versión diferente es similar a la vista de Shafii y Maliki, como se discute más adelante). Así, cuando el oro se cambia por oro, o la plata se intercambia por plata, sólo las transacciones al contado sin ninguna ganancia son admisibles. También es posible que en un intercambio dado, uno de los dos elementos de la causa eficiente (illa) esté presente y el otro esté ausente. Por ejemplo, si los artículos intercambiados son todos pesables o mensurables, pero pertenecen a géneros diferentes (jins) o, si los artículos intercambiados pertenecen al mismo género (jins) pero ninguno es pesable ni mensurable, entonces cambie con ganancia (a una tasa diferente de Unidad) es permisible, pero el intercambio debe estar en una base del punto. Por lo tanto, cuando el oro se intercambia por la plata, la tasa puede ser diferente de la unidad, pero no se permite el establecimiento diferido. Si ninguno de los dos elementos de causa eficiente (illa) de riba están presentes en un intercambio dado, entonces ninguno de los mandatos para la prohibición riba se aplica. El canje puede tener lugar con o sin ganancia y ambos en un lugar o diferido. Considerando el caso de intercambio de monedas de papel pertenecientes a diferentes países, la prohibición riba requeriría una búsqueda de causa eficiente (illa). Las monedas pertenecientes a diferentes países son entidades claramente diferenciadas que son moneda de curso legal dentro de límites geográficos específicos con diferente valor intrínseco o poder adquisitivo. Por lo tanto, una gran mayoría de estudiosos acertadamente afirman que no hay unidad de género (jins). Además, no son ni pesables ni medibles. Esto lleva a una conclusión directa de que ninguno de los dos elementos de la causa eficiente (illa) de riba existe en dicho intercambio. Por lo tanto, el canje puede tener lugar libre de cualquier prescripción sobre el tipo de cambio y la forma de liquidación. La lógica subyacente a esta posición no es difícil de comprender. El valor intrínseco de las monedas de papel pertenecientes a diferentes países difieren, ya que tienen un poder adquisitivo diferente. Además, el valor intrínseco o el valor de las monedas de papel no puede ser identificado o evaluado a diferencia de oro y plata que puede ser pesado. Por lo tanto, ni la presencia de riba al-fadl (por exceso), ni riba al-nasia (por aplazamiento) puede establecerse. La escuela Shafii de Fiqh considera la causa eficiente (illa) en caso de que el oro y la plata sean su propiedad de ser moneda (thamaniyya) o el medio de intercambio, unidad de cuenta y almacén de valor. Esta es también la vista de Maliki. Según una versión de este punto de vista, incluso si el papel o el cuero se convierte en el medio de intercambio y se le da el estatus de divisa, entonces todas las reglas relativas a naqdain, o oro y plata se les aplican. Así, según esta versión, es permisible el intercambio de monedas de diferentes países a una tasa distinta de la unidad, pero debe ser liquidado sobre una base puntual. Otra versión de las dos escuelas de pensamiento anteriores es que la citada causa eficiente (illa) de la moneda (thamaniyya) es específica del oro y la plata, y no puede generalizarse. Es decir, cualquier otro objeto, si se utiliza como medio de intercambio, no puede ser incluido en su categoría. Por lo tanto, según esta versión, los mandamientos de la Sharia para la prohibición riba no son aplicables a las monedas de papel. Las monedas pertenecientes a diferentes países se pueden intercambiar con o sin ganancia y tanto de forma puntual como diferida. Los defensores de la versión anterior citan el caso del intercambio de monedas de papel pertenecientes al mismo país en defensa de su versión. La opinión consensuada de los juristas en este caso es que dicho intercambio debe ser sin ganancia o a una tasa igual a la unidad y debe ser liquidado sobre una base spot. Si se considera la Hanafi y la primera versión de la posición Hanbali, entonces, en este caso, sólo una dimensión de la causa eficiente (illa) está presente, es decir, pertenecen al mismo género (jins ). Pero las monedas de papel no son ni pesables ni mensurables. Por lo tanto, la ley de Hanafi permitiría al parecer el intercambio de cantidades diferentes de la misma moneda sobre una base del punto. Del mismo modo, si la causa eficiente de la moneda (thamaniyya) es específica sólo para el oro y la plata, entonces la ley Shafii y Maliki también permitiría lo mismo. Huelga decir que esto equivale a permitir préstamos y préstamos basados en riba. Esto demuestra que es la primera versión del pensamiento de Shafii y Maliki que subyace a la decisión de consenso de prohibición de ganancia y liquidación diferida en caso de cambio de divisas pertenecientes al mismo país. Según los proponentes, extender esta lógica al intercambio de monedas de diferentes países implicaría que el intercambio con ganancia oa una tasa diferente de la unidad es permisible (ya que no hay unidad de jin), pero la liquidación debe ser sobre una base puntual. 2.1.2 Comparación entre Currency Exchange y Bai-Sarf Bai-sarf se define en la literatura Fiqh como un intercambio que implica el thaman haqiqi, definido como oro y plata, que sirvió como principal medio de intercambio para casi todas las transacciones importantes. Los partidarios de la opinión de que cualquier intercambio de monedas de diferentes países son iguales a los bai-sarf sostienen que en la actualidad las monedas de papel han reemplazado eficaz y completamente el oro y la plata como medio de intercambio. Por lo tanto, por analogía, el intercambio que involucra tales monedas debe ser gobernado por las mismas reglas de Sharia y mandamientos como bai-sarf. También se argumenta que si se permite la liquidación diferida por cualquiera de las partes en el contrato, esto abriría las posibilidades de riba-al nasia. Los opositores de la categorización del intercambio de moneda con bai-sarf sin embargo señalan que el intercambio de todas las formas de la moneda (thaman) no se puede llamar bai-sarf. Según este punto de vista, bai-sarf implica el intercambio de monedas de oro y plata (thaman haqiqi o naqdain) y no de dinero pronunciado como tal por las autoridades estatales (thaman istalahi). Las monedas de la era actual son ejemplos de esta última clase. Estos eruditos encuentran apoyo en aquellos escritos que afirman que si las mercancías de intercambio no son oro o plata, (aunque sea una de ellas es oro o plata) entonces, el intercambio no puede ser llamado como bai-sarf. Tampoco las estipulaciones relativas al bai-sarf serían aplicables a tales intercambios. Según el Imam Sarakhsi, cuando un individuo compra falsos o monedas hechas de metales inferiores, como el cobre (thaman istalahi) para los dirhams (thaman haqiqi) y hace un pago al contado de este último, pero el vendedor no tiene fals en ese momento , Entonces dicho intercambio es permisible. Tomar posesión de mercancías intercambiadas por ambas partes no es una precondición (mientras que en el caso de bai-sarf, lo es). Existen varias referencias similares que indican que los juristas no clasifican un intercambio de fals (thaman istalahi) por otro fals ( Thaman istalahi) o oro o plata (thaman haqiqi), como bai-sarf. Por lo tanto, los intercambios de monedas de dos países diferentes que sólo pueden calificar como thaman istalahi no pueden ser clasificados como bai-sarf. Tampoco puede imponerse la restricción relativa a la liquidación al contado de tales transacciones. Cabe señalar aquí que la definición de bai-sarf se proporciona Fiqh literatura y no hay mención de lo mismo en las tradiciones santas. Las tradiciones mencionan la riba, y la venta y compra de oro y plata (naqdain), que puede ser una fuente importante de riba, es descrita como bai-sarf por los juristas islámicos. También hay que señalar que en la literatura Fiqh, bai-sarf implica el intercambio de oro o plata sólo si se están utilizando actualmente como medio de intercambio o no. Intercambio de dinares y adornos de oro, tanto de calidad como bai-sarf. Varios juristas han tratado de aclarar este punto y han definido el sarf como aquel intercambio en el cual ambas mercancías intercambiadas están en la naturaleza de thaman, no necesariamente thaman ellos mismos. Por lo tanto, incluso cuando una de las mercancías se procesa oro (digamos, adornos), ese intercambio se llama bai-sarf. Los defensores de la opinión de que el cambio de divisas debe ser tratado de una manera similar a bai-sarf también derivan el apoyo de escritos de eminentes juristas islámicos. De acuerdo con Imam Ibn Taimiya quotanything que desempeña las funciones de medio de intercambio, unidad de cuenta, y almacén de valor se llama thaman, (no necesariamente limitado a oro y plata). Referencias similares están disponibles en los escritos del Imam Ghazzali5. En cuanto a las opiniones del Imam Sarakhshi sobre el intercambio de fals, según ellos, hay que tener en cuenta algunos puntos adicionales. En los primeros días del Islam, los dinares y dirhams hechos de oro y plata se usaban principalmente como medio de intercambio en todas las transacciones importantes. Sólo los menores se asentaron con fals. En otras palabras, fals no poseía las características de dinero o thamaniyya en su totalidad y apenas se usaba como almacén de valor o unidad de cuenta y era más en la naturaleza de la mercancía. Por lo tanto no hubo restricción en la compra de la misma para el oro y la plata sobre una base aplazada. Las monedas actuales tienen todas las características de thaman y están destinadas a ser sólo thaman. El intercambio con monedas de diferentes países es el mismo que bai-sarf con diferencia de jins y por lo tanto, el establecimiento diferido llevaría a riba al-nasia. El Dr. Mohamed Nejatullah Siddiqui ilustra esta posibilidad con un ejemplo6. Escribe en un momento dado cuando la tasa de cambio del mercado entre el dólar y la rupia es 1:20, si una persona compra 50 a la tasa de 1:22 (liquidación de su obligación en rupias aplazada a una fecha futura), entonces Es muy probable que lo sea. De hecho, el endeudamiento Rs. 1000 ahora en lugar de una promesa de reembolsar Rs. 1100 en una fecha posterior especificada. (Puesto que, puede obtener Rs 1000 ahora, intercambiando los 50 comprados en el crédito a la tarifa al contado). Así pues, el sarf se puede convertir en préstamo prestado del préstamo de interés-basado. 2.1.3 Definir Thamaniyya es la clave De la síntesis anterior de puntos de vista alternativos se desprende que la cuestión clave parece ser una definición correcta de thamaniyya. Por ejemplo, una cuestión fundamental que lleva a posiciones divergentes sobre la permisibilidad se refiere a si el thamaniyya es específico del oro y la plata, o puede asociarse con cualquier cosa que desempeñe las funciones del dinero. A continuación se plantean algunas cuestiones que pueden tenerse en cuenta en cualquier ejercicio de reconsideración de posiciones alternativas. Debe apreciarse que el thamaniyya puede no ser absoluto y puede variar en grados. Es cierto que las monedas de papel han reemplazado completamente el oro y la plata como medio de intercambio, unidad de cuenta y almacén de valor. En este sentido, las monedas de papel se puede decir que poseen thamaniyya. Sin embargo, esto es cierto sólo para las monedas nacionales y puede no ser cierto para las monedas extranjeras. En otras palabras, las rupias indias poseen thamaniyya dentro de los límites geográficos de la India solamente, y no tienen ninguna aceptabilidad en los Estados Unidos. Estos no se puede decir que poseen thamaniyya en EE. UU. a menos que un ciudadano de EE. UU. puede utilizar rupias indias como un medio de intercambio, o unidad de cuenta, o almacén de valor. En la mayoría de los casos tal posibilidad es remota. Esta posibilidad es también una función del mecanismo de tipo de cambio vigente, como la convertibilidad de las rupias indias en dólares estadounidenses y si existe un sistema de tipo de cambio fijo o flotante. Por ejemplo, asumiendo la convertibilidad libre de rupias indias en dólares estadounidenses y viceversa, y un sistema de tipo de cambio fijo en el que no se espera que el tipo de cambio rupia-dólar aumente o disminuya en el futuro previsible, . El ejemplo citado por el Dr. Nejatullah Siddiqui también parece bastante sólido en las circunstancias. El permiso para canjear rupias por dólares en base diferida (desde un extremo, por supuesto) a una tasa diferente del tipo al contado (tasa oficial que es probable que permanezca fijo hasta la fecha de liquidación) sería un claro caso de interés basado en Préstamos y préstamos. Sin embargo, si se supone que el supuesto de tipo de cambio fijo es relajado y se asume que el actual sistema de tipos de cambio fluctuantes y volátiles es el caso, entonces se puede demostrar que el caso de riba al-nasia se rompe. Reescribimos su ejemplo: en un momento dado en que la tasa de cambio del mercado entre dólar y rupia es 1:20, si un individuo compra 50 a la tasa de 1:22 (liquidación de su obligación en rupias aplazada a una fecha futura ), Entonces es muy probable que lo sea. De hecho, el endeudamiento Rs. 1000 ahora en lugar de una promesa de reembolsar Rs. 1100 en una fecha posterior especificada. (Puesto que, ahora puede obtener Rs 1000, intercambiando los 50 comprados a crédito al tipo de cambio al contado). Esto sería así, sólo si el riesgo cambiario es inexistente (el tipo de cambio permanece en 1:20), o es soportado por Vendedor de dólares (el comprador paga en rupias y no en dólares). Si el primero es cierto, entonces el vendedor de los dólares (prestamista) recibe un rendimiento predeterminado de diez por ciento cuando convierte Rs1100 recibido en la fecha de vencimiento en 55 (a un tipo de cambio de 1:20). Sin embargo, si esto último es cierto, entonces el retorno al vendedor (o al prestamista) no está predeterminado. Ni siquiera es positivo. Por ejemplo, si el tipo de cambio rupia-dólar aumenta a 1:25, entonces el vendedor de dólar recibiría sólo 44 (Rs 1100 convertido en dólares) por su inversión de 50. Aquí dos puntos son dignos de mención. En primer lugar, cuando se asume un régimen de tipo de cambio fijo, la distinción entre monedas de diferentes países se diluye. La situación se vuelve similar al intercambio de libras esterlinas (monedas pertenecientes al mismo país) a una tasa fija. En segundo lugar, cuando se asume un sistema de tipo de cambio volátil, entonces, tal como se puede visualizar el préstamo a través del mercado de divisas (mecanismo sugerido en el ejemplo anterior), también se puede visualizar el préstamo a través de cualquier otro mercado organizado (por ejemplo, Si se reemplaza el dólar por acciones en el ejemplo anterior, se leería como sigue: En un momento dado en que el precio de mercado de la acción X es Rs 20, si un individuo compra 50 acciones a razón de Rs 22 (liquidación de Su obligación en rupias aplazada a una fecha futura), entonces es muy probable que lo sea. De hecho, el endeudamiento Rs. 1000 ahora en lugar de una promesa de reembolsar Rs. 1100 en una fecha posterior especificada. (Puesto que, ahora puede obtener Rs 1000, intercambiando las 50 acciones compradas a crédito a precio actual). En este caso también, como en el ejemplo anterior, los rendimientos del vendedor de acciones pueden ser negativos si el precio de las acciones sube a Rs 25 fecha de liquidación. Por lo tanto, al igual que los rendimientos en el mercado de valores o de materias primas son islámicamente aceptables debido al riesgo de precio, también lo son los rendimientos en el mercado de divisas debido a las fluctuaciones en los precios de las monedas. Una característica única de thaman haqiqi o oro y plata es que el valor intrínseco de la moneda es igual a su valor nominal. Por lo tanto, la cuestión de los diferentes límites geográficos dentro de los cuales circula una moneda determinada, como dinar o dirham, es completamente irrelevante. El oro es oro, ya sea en el país A o en el país B. Así, cuando la divisa del país A de oro se cambia por moneda del país B, también hecha de oro, entonces cualquier desviación del tipo de cambio de la unidad o diferimiento de liquidación por cualquiera de las partes No puede ser permitido ya que implicaría claramente riba al-fadl y también riba al-nasia. Sin embargo, cuando las monedas de papel del país A se intercambian por el papel moneda del país B, el caso puede ser completamente diferente. El riesgo de precio (riesgo de tipo de cambio), si es positivo, eliminaría cualquier posibilidad de riba al-nasia en el canje con liquidación diferida. Sin embargo, si el riesgo de precio (riesgo de tipo de cambio) es cero, dicho intercambio podría ser una fuente de riba al-nasia si se permite la liquidación diferida7. Otro punto que merece una seria consideración es la posibilidad de que ciertas monedas puedan poseer thamaniyya, es decir, utilizado como medio de intercambio, unidad de cuenta o almacén de valor globalmente, tanto en el interior como en el extranjero. Por ejemplo, el dólar estadounidense es moneda de curso legal dentro de los EE. UU. también es aceptable como medio de intercambio o unidad de cuenta para un gran volumen de transacciones en todo el mundo. Por lo tanto, se puede decir que esta moneda específica posee thamaniyya a nivel mundial, en cuyo caso, los juristas pueden imponer los mandatos pertinentes sobre los intercambios que implican esta moneda específica para prevenir riba al-nasia. El hecho es que cuando una moneda posee thamaniyya globalmente, las unidades económicas que utilizan esta moneda global como medio de cambio, unidad de cuenta o almacén de valor pueden no estar preocupadas por el riesgo derivado de la volatilidad de los tipos de cambio entre países. Al mismo tiempo, debe reconocerse que una gran mayoría de las monedas no desempeñan las funciones de dinero excepto dentro de sus fronteras nacionales cuando éstas son moneda de curso legal. Riba y el riesgo no pueden coexistir en el mismo contrato. El primero conoce una posibilidad de rendimientos con riesgo cero y no puede ganarse a través de un mercado con riesgo de precio positivo. Como se ha discutido anteriormente, la posibilidad de riba al-fadl o riba al-nasia puede surgir a cambio cuando el oro o la plata funcionan como thaman o cuando el intercambio implica monedas de papel pertenecientes al mismo país o cuando el intercambio implica monedas de diferentes países Siguiendo un sistema de tipo de cambio fijo. La última posibilidad es tal vez unísmica8, ya que se debe permitir que el precio o el tipo de cambio de las monedas fluctúen libremente en línea con los cambios en la demanda y la oferta y también porque los precios deben reflejar el valor intrínseco o el poder adquisitivo de las monedas. Los mercados de divisas de hoy se caracterizan por tipos de cambio volátiles. Las ganancias o pérdidas realizadas en cualquier transacción en monedas de diferentes países, se justifican por el riesgo asumido por las partes en el contrato. 2.1.4. Posibilidad de Riba con futuros y forwards Hasta ahora, hemos discutido puntos de vista sobre la permisibilidad de bai salam en divisas, es decir, cuando la obligación de sólo una de las partes en el intercambio se aplazó. ¿Cuáles son las opiniones de los académicos sobre el aplazamiento de las obligaciones de ambas partes. Un ejemplo típico de tales contratos son forwards y futuros9. Según una gran mayoría de estudiosos, esto no es permisible por diversos motivos, siendo el más importante el elemento de riesgo e incertidumbre (gharar) y la posibilidad de especulación de un tipo que no es permisible. Esto se discute en la sección 3. Sin embargo, otro motivo para rechazar tales contratos puede ser riba prohibición. En el párrafo anterior hemos discutido que bai salam en monedas con tipos de cambio fluctuantes no puede ser utilizado para ganar riba debido a la presencia de riesgo de moneda. Es posible demostrar que el riesgo de divisa puede ser cubierto o reducido a cero con otro contrato a término negociado simultáneamente. Y una vez que se elimine el riesgo, la ganancia sería claramente riba. Modificamos y reescribimos el mismo ejemplo: en un momento dado en que la tasa de cambio de mercado entre dólar y rupia es 1:20, una persona compra 50 a la tasa de 1:22 (liquidación de su obligación en rupias aplazada a una Fecha futura), y el vendedor de dólares también cubre su posición mediante la celebración de un contrato a término para vender Rs1100 a recibir en la fecha futura a una tasa de 1:20, entonces es muy probable que lo sea. De hecho, el endeudamiento Rs. 1000 ahora en lugar de una promesa de reembolsar Rs. 1100 en una fecha posterior especificada. (El vendedor de los dólares (prestamista) recibe un rendimiento predeterminado del diez por ciento cuando convierte Rs1100 recibido en la fecha de vencimiento en 55 dólares ( A un tipo de cambio de 1:20) para su inversión de 50 dólares, independientemente del tipo de cambio de mercado vigente en la fecha de vencimiento. Otra forma sencilla de obtener riba puede incluso implicar una transacción al contado y una transacción simultánea hacia adelante. Por ejemplo, el individuo en el ejemplo anterior compra 50 en una base de punto a la tasa de 1:20 y simultáneamente celebra un contrato a término con la misma parte para vender 50 a la tasa de 1:21 después de un mes. En efecto, esto implica que está prestando Rs1000 ahora al vendedor de dólares por un mes y gana un interés de Rs50 (que recibe Rs1050 después de un mes. Esto es un típico de recompra o recompra transacción tan común en la banca convencional .10 3. La cuestión de la libertad de Gharar Gharar, a diferencia de la riba, no tiene una definición de consenso. En términos generales, connota el riesgo y la incertidumbre. Es útil para ver gharar como un continuo de riesgo e incertidumbre donde el punto extremo de El riesgo cero es el único punto que está bien definido. Además de este punto, gharar se convierte en una variable y el gharar involucrado en un contrato de vida real estaría en algún lugar de este continuum. Más allá de un punto en este continuo, el riesgo y la incertidumbre o gharar se vuelve inaceptable11 Los juristas han intentado identificar tales situaciones que implican gharar prohibido. Un factor importante que contribuye a gharar es la información inadecuada (jahl) que aumenta la incertidumbre. Esto es cuando los términos de intercambio, como el precio, los objetos de intercambio, el tiempo de establecimiento, etc No están bien definidos. Gharar también se define en términos de riesgo de liquidación o la incertidumbre que rodea la entrega de los artículos intercambiados. Los estudiosos islámicos han identificado las condiciones que hacen que un contrato sea incierto en la medida en que está prohibido. Each party to the contract must be clear as to the quantity, specification, price, time, and place of delivery of the contract. A contract, say, to sell fish in the river involves uncertainty about the subject of exchange, about its delivery, and hence, not Islamically permissible. The need to eliminate any element of uncertainty inherent in a contract is underscored by a number of traditions.12 An outcome of excessive gharar or uncertainty is that it leads to the possibility of speculation of a variety which is forbidden. Speculation in its worst form, is gambling. The holy Quran and the traditions of the holy prophet explicitly prohibit gains made from games of chance which involve unearned income. The term used for gambling is maisir which literally means getting something too easily, getting a profit without working for it. Apart from pure games of chance, the holy prophet also forbade actions which generated unearned incomes without much productive efforts.13 Here it may be noted that the term speculation has different connotations. It always involves an attempt to predict the future outcome of an event. But the process may or may not be backed by collection, analysis and interpretation of relevant information. The former case is very much in conformity with Islamic rationality. Una unidad económica islámica se requiere para asumir el riesgo después de hacer una evaluación adecuada del riesgo con la ayuda de la información. All business decisions involve speculation in this sense. It is only in the absence of information or under conditions of excessive gharar or uncertainty that speculation is akin to a game of chance and is reprehensible. 3.2 Gharar amp Speculation with of Futures amp Forwards Considering the case of the basic exchange contracts highlighted in section 1, it may be noted that the third type of contract where settlement by both the parties is deferred to a future date is forbidden, according to a large majority of jurists on grounds of excessive gharar. Futures and forwards in currencies are examples of such contracts under which two parties become obliged to exchange currencies of two different countries at a known rate at the end of a known time period. For example, individuals A and B commit to exchange US dollars and Indian rupees at the rate of 1: 22 after one month. If the amount involved is 50 and A is the buyer of dollars then, the obligations of A and B are to make a payments of Rs1100 and 50 respectively at the end of one month. The contract is settled when both the parties honour their obligations on the future date. Traditionally, an overwhelming majority of Sharia scholars have disapproved such contracts on several grounds. The prohibition applies to all such contracts where the obligations of both parties are deferred to a future date, including contracts involving exchange of currencies. An important objection is that such a contract involves sale of a non-existent object or of an object not in the possession of the seller. This objection is based on several traditions of the holy prophet.14 There is difference of opinion on whether the prohibition in the said traditions apply to foodstuffs, or perishable commodities or to all objects of sale. There is, however, a general agreement on the view that the efficient cause (illa) of the prohibition of sale of an object which the seller does not own or of sale prior to taking possession is gharar, or the possible failure to deliver the goods purchased. Is this efficient cause (illa) present in an exchange involving future contracts in currencies of different countries. In a market with full and free convertibility or no constraints on the supply of currencies, the probability of failure to deliver the same on the maturity date should be no cause for concern. Further, the standardized nature of futures contracts and transparent operating procedures on the organized futures markets15 is believed to minimize this probability. Some recent scholars have opined in the light of the above that futures, in general, should be permissible. According to them, the efficient cause (illa), that is, the probability of failure to deliver was quite relevant in a simple, primitive and unorganized market. It is no longer relevant in the organized futures markets of today16. Such contention, however, continues to be rejected by the majority of scholars. They underscore the fact that futures contracts almost never involve delivery by both parties. On the contrary, parties to the contract reverse the transaction and the contract is settled in price difference only. For example, in the above example, if the currency exchange rate changes to 1: 23 on the maturity date, the reverse transaction for individual A would mean selling 50 at the rate of 1:23 to individual B. This would imply A making a gain of Rs50 (the difference between Rs1150 and Rs1100). This is exactly what B would lose. It may so happen that the exchange rate would change to 1:21 in which case A would lose Rs50 which is what B would gain. This obviously is a zero-sum game in which the gain of one party is exactly equal to the loss of the other. This possibility of gains or losses (which theoretically can touch infinity) encourages economic units to speculate on the future direction of exchange rates. Since exchange rates fluctuate randomly, gains and losses are random too and the game is reduced to a game of chance. There is a vast body of literature on the forecastability of exchange rates and a large majority of empirical studies have provided supporting evidence on the futility of any attempt to make short-run predictions. Exchange rates are volatile and remain unpredictable at least for the large majority of market participants. Needless to say, any attempt to speculate in the hope of the theoretically infinite gains is, in all likelihood, a game of chance for such participants. While the gains, if they materialize, are in the nature of maisir or unearned gains, the possibility of equally massive losses do indicate a possibility of default by the loser and hence, gharar. 3.3. Risk Management in Volatile Markets Hedging or risk reduction adds to planning and managerial efficiency. The economic justification of futures and forwards is in term of their role as a device for hedging. In the context of currency markets which are characterized by volatile rates, such contracts are believed to enable the parties to transfer and eliminate risk arising out of such fluctuations. For example, modifying the earlier example, assume that individual A is an exporter from India to US who has already sold some commodities to B, the US importer and anticipates a cashflow of 50 (which at the current market rate of 1:22 mean Rs 1100 to him) after one month. There is a possibility that US dollar may depreciate against Indian rupee during these one month, in which case A would realize less amount of rupees for his 50 ( if the new rate is 1:21, A would realize only Rs1050 ). Hence, A may enter into a forward or future contract to sell 50 at the rate of 1:21.5 at the end of one month (and thereby, realize Rs1075) with any counterparty which, in all probability, would have diametrically opposite expectations regarding future direction of exchange rates. In this case, A is able to hedge his position and at the same time, forgoes the opportunity of making a gain if his expectations do not materialize and US dollar appreciates against Indian rupee (say, to 1:23 which implies that he would have realized Rs1150, and not Rs1075 which he would realize now.) While hedging tools always improve planning and hence, performance, it should be noted that the intention of the contracting party - whether to hedge or to speculate, can never be ascertained. It may be noted that hedging can also be accomplished with bai salam in currencies. As in the above example, exporter A anticipating a cash inflow of 50 after one month and expecting a depreciation of dollar may go for a salam sale of 50 (with his obligation to pay 50 deferred by one month.) Since he is expecting a dollar depreciation, he may agree to sell 50 at the rate of 1: 21.5. There would be an immediate cash inflow in Rs 1075 for him. The question may be, why should the counterparty pay him rupees now in lieu of a promise to be repaid in dollars after one month. As in the case of futures, the counterparty would do so for profit, if its expectations are diametrically opposite, that is, it expects dollar to appreciate. For example, if dollar appreciates to 1: 23 during the one month period, then it would receive Rs1150 for Rs 1075 it invested in the purchase of 50. Thus, while A is able to hedge its position, the counterparty is able to earn a profit on trading of currencies. The difference from the earlier scenario is that the counterparty would be more restrained in trading because of the investment required, and such trading is unlikely to take the shape of rampant speculation. 4. Summary amp Conclusion Currency markets of today are characterized by volatile exchange rates. This fact should be taken note of in any analysis of the three basic types of contracts in which the basis of distinction is the possibility of deferment of obligations to future. We have attempted an assessment of these forms of contracting in terms of the overwhelming need to eliminate any possibility of riba, minimize gharar, jahl and the possibility of speculation of a kind akin to games of chance. En un mercado volátil, los participantes están expuestos al riesgo de cambio y la racionalidad islámica requiere que dicho riesgo se minimice en interés de la eficiencia si no se reduce a cero. It is obvious that spot settlement of the obligations of both parties would completely prohibit riba, and gharar, and minimize the possibility of speculation. However, this would also imply the absence of any technique of risk management and may involve some practical problems for the participants. At the other extreme, if the obligations of both the parties are deferred to a future date, then such contracting, in all likelihood, would open up the possibility of infinite unearned gains and losses from what may be rightly termed for the majority of participants as games of chance. Of course, these would also enable the participants to manage risk through complete risk transfer to others and reduce risk to zero. It is this possibility of risk reduction to zero which may enable a participant to earn riba. Future is not a new form of contract. Rather the justification for proscribing it is new. If in a simple primitive economy, it was prevention of gharar relating to delivery of the exchanged article, in todays39 complex financial system and organized exchanges, it is prevention of speculation of kind which is unIslamic and which is possible under excessive gharar involved in forecasting highly volatile exchange rates. Such speculation is not just a possibility, but a reality. El motivo exacto de una unidad económica que entra en un futuro contrato - la especulación o la cobertura puede no ser determinable (los reguladores pueden monitorear el uso final, pero tal regulación puede no ser muy práctica ni efectiva en un mercado libre). Empirical evidence at a macro level, however, indicates the former to be the dominant motive. The second type of contracting with deferment of obligations of one of the parties to a future date falls between the two extremes. While Sharia scholars have divergent views about its permissibility, our analysis reveals that there is no possibility of earning riba with this kind of contracting. The requirement of spot settlement of obligations of atleast one party imposes a natural curb on speculation, though the room for speculation is greater than under the first form of contracting. The requirement amounts to imposition of a hundred percent margin which, in all probability, would drive away the uninformed speculator from the market. This should force the speculator to be a little more sure of his expectations by being more informed. When speculation is based on information it is not only permissible, but desirable too. Bai salam would also enable the participants to manage risk. At the same time, the requirement of settlement from one end would dampen the tendency of many participants to seek a complete transfer of perceived risk and encourage them to make a realistic assessment of the actual risk. Notes amp References 1. These diverse views are reflected in the papers presented at the Fourth Fiqh Seminar organized by the Islamic Fiqh Academy, India in 1991 which were subsequently published in Majalla Fiqh Islami, part 4 by the Academy. The discussion on riba prohibition draws on these views. 2. Nabil Saleh, Unlawful gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, Graham and Trotman, London, 1992, p.16 3. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni, vol.4, pp.5-9 4. Shams al Din al Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, vol 14, pp 24-25 5. Paper presented by Abdul Azim Islahi at the Fourth Fiqh Seminar organized by Islamic Fiqh Academy, India in 1991. 6. Paper by Dr M N Siddiqui highlighting the issue was circulated among all leading Fiqh scholars by the Islamic Fiqh Academy, India for their views and was the main theme of deliberations during the session on Currency Exchange at the Fourth Fiqh Seminar held in 1991. 7. It is contended by some that the above example may be modified to show the possibility of riba with spot settlement too. quotIn a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, if an individual purchases 50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation also on a spot basis), then it amounts to the seller of dollars exchanging 50 with 55 on a spot basis (Since, he can obtain Rs 1100 now, exchange them for 55 at spot rate of 1:20)quot Thus, spot settlement can also be a clear source of riba. Does this imply that spot settlement should be proscribed too. The fallacy in the above and earlier examples is that there is no single contract but multiple contracts of exchange occurring at different points in time (true even in the above case). Riba can be earned only when the spot rate of 1:20 is fixed during the time interval between the transactions. This assumption is, needless to say, unrealistic and if imposed artificially, perhaps unIslamic. 8. Islam envisages a free market where prices are determined by forces of demand and supply. There should be no interference in the price formation process even by the regulators. While price control and fixation is generally accepted as unIslamic, some scholars, such as, Ibn Taimiya do admit of its permissibility. However, such permissibility is subject to the condition that price fixation is intended to combat cases of market anomalies caused by impairing the conditions of free competition. If market conditions are normal, forces of demand and supply should be allowed a free play in determination of prices. 9. Some Islamic scholars use the term forward to connote a salam sale. However, we use this term in the conventional sense where the obligations of both parties are deferred to a future date and hence, are similar to futures in this sense. The latter however, are standardized contracts and are traded on an organized Futures Exchange while the former are specific to the requirements of the buyer and seller. 10. This is known as bai al inah which is considered forbidden by almost all scholars with the exception of Imam Shafii. Followers of the same school, such as Al Nawawi do not consider it Islamically permissible. 11. It should be noted that modern finance theories also distinguish between conditions of risk and uncertainty and assert that rational decision making is possible only under conditions of risk and not under conditions of uncertainty. Conditions of risk refer to a situation where it is possible with the help of available data to estimate all possible outcomes and their corresponding probabilities, or develop the ex-ante probability distribution. Under conditions of uncertainty, no such exercise is possible. The definition of gharar, Real-life situations, of course, fall somewhere in the continuum of risk and uncertainty. 12. The following traditions underscore the need to avoid contracts involving uncertainty. Ibn Abbas reported that when Allah39s prophet (pbuh) came to Medina, they were paying one and two years advance for fruits, so he said: quotThose who pay in advance for any thing must do so for a specified weight and for a definite timequot. It is reported on the authority of Ibn Umar that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) forbade the transaction called habal al-habala whereby a man bought a she-camel which was to be the off-spring of a she-camel and which was still in its mother39s womb. 13. According to a tradition reported by Abu Huraira, Allah39s Messenger (pbuh) forbade a transaction determined by throwing stones, and the type which involves some uncertainty. The form of gambling most popular to Arabs was gambling by casting lots by means of arrows, on the principle of lottery, for division of carcass of slaughtered animals. The carcass was divided into unequal parts and marked arrows were drawn from a bag. One received a large or small share depending on the mark on the arrow drawn. Obviously it was a pure game of chance. 14. The holy prophet is reported to have said quot Do not sell what is not with youquot Ibn Abbas reported that the prophet said: quotHe who buys foodstuff should not sell it until he has taken possession of it. quot Ibn Abbas said: quotI think it applies to all other things as wellquot. 15. The Futures Exchange performs an important function of providing a guarantee for delivery by all parties to the contract. It serves as the counterparty in the exchange for both, that is, as the buyer for the sale and as the seller for the purchase. 16. M Hashim Kamali quotIslamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futuresquot, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol.13, no.2, 1996 Send Your Comments to: Dr Mohammed Obaidullah, Xavier Institute of Management, Bhubaneswar 751 013, India Mail to: obeidximb. stpbh. soft. net Add this page to your favorite Social Bookmarking websites More. Islamic Forex Trading ISLAMIC FOREX TRADING 1. The Basic Exchange Contracts There is a general consensus among Islamic jurists on the view that currencies of different countries can be exchanged on a spot basis at a rate different from unity, since currencies of different countries are distinct entities with different values or intrinsic worth, and purchasing power. There also seems to be a general agreement among a majority of scholars on the view that currency exchange on a forward basis is not permissible, that is, when the rights and obligations of both parties relate to a future date. However, there is considerable difference of opinion among jurists when the rights of either one of the parties, which is same as obligation of the counterparty, is deferred to a future date. To elaborate, let us consider the example of two individuals A and B who belong to two different countries, India and US respectively. A intends to sell Indian rupees and buy U. S dollars. The converse is true for B. The rupee-dollar exchange rate agreed upon is 1:20 and the transaction involves buying and selling of 50. The first situation is that A makes a spot payment of Rs1000 to B and accepts payment of 50 from B. The transaction is settled on a spot basis from both ends. Such transactions are valid and Islamically permissible. There are no two opinions about the same. The second possibility is that settlement of the transaction from both ends is deferred to a future date, say after six months from now. This implies that both A and B would make and accept payment of Rs1000 or 50, as the case may be, after six months. The predominant view is that such a contract is not Islamically permissible. A minority view considers it permissible. The third scenario is that the transaction is partly settled from one end only. For example, A makes a payment of Rs1000 now to B in lieu of a promise by B to pay 50 to him after six months. Alternatively, A accepts 50 now from B and promises to pay Rs1000 to him after six months. There are diametrically opposite views on the permissibility of such contracts which amount to bai-salam in currencies. The purpose of this paper is to present a comprehensive analysis of various arguments in support and against the permissibility of these basic contracts involving currencies. The first form of contracting involving exchange of countervalues on a spot basis is beyond any kind of controversy. Permissibility or otherwise of the second type of contract in which delivery of one of the countervalues is deferred to a future date, is generally discussed in the framework of riba prohibition. Accordingly we discuss this contract in detail in section 2 dealing with the issue of prohibition of riba. Permissibility of the third form of contract in which delivery of both the countervalues is deferred, is generally discussed within the framework of reducing risk and uncertainty or gharar involved in such contracts. This, therefore, is the central theme of section 3 which deals with the issue of gharar. Section 4 attempts a holistic view of the Sharia relates issues as also the economic significance of the basic forms of contracting in the currency market. 2. The Issue of Riba Prohibition The divergence of views1 on the permissibility or otherwise of exchange contracts in currencies can be traced primarily to the issue of riba prohibition. The need to eliminate riba in all forms of exchange contracts is of utmost importance. Riba in its Sharia context is generally defined2 as an unlawful gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the countervalues in any transaction purporting to effect the exchange of two or more species (anwa), which belong to the same genus (jins) and are governed by the same efficient cause (illa). Riba is generally classified into riba al-fadl (excess) and riba al-nasia (deferment) which denote an unlawful advantage by way of excess or deferment respectively. Prohibition of the former is achieved by a stipulation that the rate of exchange between the objects is unity and no gain is permissible to either party. The latter kind of riba is prohibited by disallowing deferred settlement and ensuring that the transaction is settled on the spot by both the parties. Another form of riba is called riba al-jahiliyya or pre-Islamic riba which surfaces when the lender asks the borrower on the maturity date if the latter would settle the debt or increase the same. Increase is accompanied by charging interest on the amount initially borrowed. The prohibition of riba in the exchange of currencies belonging to different countries requires a process of analogy (qiyas). And in any such exercise involving analogy (qiyas), efficient cause (illa) plays an extremely important role. It is a common efficient cause (illa), which connects the object of the analogy with its subject, in the exercise of analogical reasoning. The appropriate efficient cause (illa) in case of exchange contracts has been variously defined by the major schools of Fiqh. This difference is reflected in the analogous reasoning for paper currencies belonging to different countries. A question of considerable significance in the process of analogous reasoning relates to the comparison between paper currencies with gold and silver. In the early days of Islam, gold and silver performed all the functions of money (thaman). Currencies were made of gold and silver with a known intrinsic value (quantum of gold or silver contained in them). Such currencies are described as thaman haqiqi, or naqdain in Fiqh literature. These were universally acceptable as principal means of exchange, accounting for a large chunk of transactions. Many other commodities, such as, various inferior metals also served as means of exchange, but with limited acceptability. These are described as fals in Fiqh literature. These are also known as thaman istalahi because of the fact that their acceptability stems not from their intrinsic worth, but due to the status accorded by the society during a particular period of time. The above two forms of currencies have been treated very differently by early Islamic jurists from the standpoint of permissibility of contracts involving them. The issue that needs to be resolved is whether the present age paper currencies fall under the former category or the latter. One view is that these should be treated at par with thaman haqiqi or gold and silver, since these serve as the principal means of exchange and unit of account like the latter. Hence, by analogous reasoning, all the Sharia-related norms and injunctions applicable to thaman haqiqi should also be applicable to paper currency. Exchange of thaman haqiqi is known as bai-sarf, and hence, the transactions in paper currencies should be governed by the Sharia rules relevant for bai-sarf. The contrary view asserts that paper currencies should be treated in a manner similar to fals or thaman istalahi because of the fact that their face value is different from their intrinsic worth. Their acceptability stems from their legal status within the domestic country or global economic importance (as in case of US dollars, for instance). 2.1. A Synthesis of Alternative Views 2.1.1. Analogical Reasoning (Qiyas) for Riba Prohibition The prohibition of riba is based on the tradition that the holy prophet (peace be upon him) said, quotSell gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, date for date, salt for salt, in same quantities on the spot and when the commodities are different, sell as it suits you, but on the spot. quot Thus, the prohibition of riba applies primarily to the two precious metals (gold and silver) and four other commodities (wheat, barley, dates and salt). It also applies, by analogy (qiyas) to all species which are governed by the same efficient cause (illa) or which belong to any one of the genera of the six objects cited in the tradition. However, there is no general agreement among the various schools of Fiqh and even scholars belonging to the same school on the definition and identification of efficient cause (illa) of riba. For the Hanafis, efficient cause (illa) of riba has two dimensions: the exchanged articles belong to the same genus (jins) these possess weight (wazan) or measurability (kiliyya). If in a given exchange, both the elements of efficient cause (illa) are present, that is, the exchanged countervalues belong to the same genus (jins) and are all weighable or all measurable, then no gain is permissible (the exchange rate must be equal to unity) and the exchange must be on a spot basis. In case of gold and silver, the two elements of efficient cause (illa) are: unity of genus (jins) and weighability. This is also the Hanbali view according to one version3. (A different version is similar to the Shafii and Maliki view, as discussed below.) Thus, when gold is exchanged for gold, or silver is exchanged for silver, only spot transactions without any gain are permissible. It is also possible that in a given exchange, one of the two elements of efficient cause (illa) is present and the other is absent. For example, if the exchanged articles are all weighable or measurable but belong to different genus (jins) or, if the exchanged articles belong to same genus (jins) but neither is weighable nor measurable, then exchange with gain (at a rate different from unity) is permissible, but the exchange must be on a spot basis. Thus, when gold is exchanged for silver, the rate can be different from unity but no deferred settlement is permissible. If none of the two elements of efficient cause (illa) of riba are present in a given exchange, then none of the injunctions for riba prohibition apply. Exchange can take place with or without gain and both on a spot or deferred basis. Considering the case of exchange involving paper currencies belonging to different countries, riba prohibition would require a search for efficient cause (illa). Currencies belonging to different countries are clearly distinct entities these are legal tender within specific geographical boundaries with different intrinsic worth or purchasing power. Hence, a large majority of scholars perhaps rightly assert that there is no unity of genus (jins). Additionally, these are neither weighable nor measurable. This leads to a direct conclusion that none of the two elements of efficient cause (illa) of riba exist in such exchange. Hence, the exchange can take place free from any injunction regarding the rate of exchange and the manner of settlement. The logic underlying this position is not difficult to comprehend. The intrinsic worth of paper currencies belonging to different countries differ as these have different purchasing power. Additionally, the intrinsic value or worth of paper currencies cannot be identified or assessed unlike gold and silver which can be weighed. Hence, neither the presence of riba al-fadl (by excess), nor riba al-nasia (by deferment) can be established. The Shafii school of Fiqh considers the efficient cause (illa) in case of gold and silver to be their property of being currency (thamaniyya) or the medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. This is also the Maliki view. According to one version of this view, even if paper or leather is made the medium of exchange and is given the status of currency, then all the rules pertaining to naqdain, or gold and silver apply to them. Thus, according to this version, exchange involving currencies of different countries at a rate different from unity is permissible, but must be settled on a spot basis. Another version of the above two schools of thought is that the above cited efficient cause (illa) of being currency (thamaniyya) is specific to gold and silver, and cannot be generalized. That is, any other object, if used as a medium of exchange, cannot be included in their category. Hence, according to this version, the Sharia injunctions for riba prohibition are not applicable to paper currencies. Currencies belonging to different countries can be exchanged with or without gain and both on a spot or deferred basis. Proponents of the earlier version cite the case of exchange of paper currencies belonging to the same country in defense of their version. The consensus opinion of jurists in this case is that such exchange must be without any gain or at a rate equal to unity and must be settled on a spot basis. What is the rationale underlying the above decision If one considers the Hanafi and the first version of Hanbali position then, in this case, only one dimension of the efficient cause (illa) is present, that is, they belong to the same genus (jins). But paper currencies are neither weighable nor measurable. Hence, Hanafi law would apparently permit exchange of different quantities of the same currency on a spot basis. Similarly if the efficient cause of being currency (thamaniyya) is specific only to gold and silver, then Shafii and Maliki law would also permit the same. Needless to say, this amounts to permitting riba-based borrowing and lending. This shows that, it is the first version of the Shafii and Maliki thought which underlies the consensus decision of prohibition of gain and deferred settlement in case of exchange of currencies belonging to the same country. According to the proponents, extending this logic to exchange of currencies of different countries would imply that exchange with gain or at a rate different from unity is permissible (since there no unity of jins), but settlement must be on a spot basis. 2.1.2 Comparison between Currency Exchange and Bai-Sarf Bai-sarf is defined in Fiqh literature as an exchange involving thaman haqiqi, defined as gold and silver, which served as the principal medium of exchange for almost all major transactions. Proponents of the view that any exchange of currencies of different countries is same as bai-sarf argue that in the present age paper currencies have effectively and completely replaced gold and silver as the medium of exchange. Hence, by analogy, exchange involving such currencies should be governed by the same Sharia rules and injunctions as bai-sarf. It is also argued that if deferred settlement by either parties to the contract is permitted, this would open the possibilities of riba-al nasia. Los opositores de la categorización del intercambio de moneda con bai-sarf sin embargo señalan que el intercambio de todas las formas de la moneda (thaman) no se puede llamar bai-sarf. According to this view bai-sarf implies exchange of currencies made of gold and silver (thaman haqiqi or naqdain) alone and not of money pronounced as such by the state authorities (thaman istalahi). The present age currencies are examples of the latter kind. These scholars find support in those writings which assert that if the commodities of exchange are not gold or silver, (even if one of these is gold or silver) then, the exchange cannot be termed as bai-sarf. Nor would the stipulations regarding bai-sarf be applicable to such exchanges. According to Imam Sarakhsi4 quotwhen an individual purchases fals or coins made out of inferior metals, such as, copper (thaman istalahi) for dirhams (thaman haqiqi) and makes a spot payment of the latter, but the seller does not have fals at that moment, then such exchange is permissible. taking possession of commodities exchanged by both parties is not a preconditionquot (while in case of bai-sarf, it is.) A number of similar references exist which indicate that jurists do not classify an exchange of fals (thaman istalahi) for another fals (thaman istalahi) or gold or silver (thaman haqiqi), as bai-sarf. Hence, the exchanges of currencies of two different countries which can only qualify as thaman istalahi can not be categorized as bai-sarf. Nor can the constraint regarding spot settlement be imposed on such transactions. It should be noted here that the definition of bai-sarf is provided Fiqh literature and there is no mention of the same in the holy traditions. The traditions mention about riba, and the sale and purchase of gold and silver (naqdain) which may be a major source of riba, is described as bai-sarf by the Islamic jurists. It should also be noted that in Fiqh literature, bai-sarf implies exchange of gold or silver only whether these are currently being used as medium of exchange or not. Exchange involving dinars and gold ornaments, both quality as bai-sarf. Various jurists have sought to clarify this point and have defined sarf as that exchange in which both the commodities exchanged are in the nature of thaman, not necessarily thaman themselves. Hence, even when one of the commodities is processed gold (say, ornaments), such exchange is called bai-sarf. Proponents of the view that currency exchange should be treated in a manner similar to bai-sarf also derive support from writings of eminent Islamic jurists. According to Imam Ibn Taimiya quotanything that performs the functions of medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value is called thaman, (not necessarily limited to gold amp silver). Similar references are available in the writings of Imam Ghazzali5 As far as the views of Imam Sarakhshi is concerned regarding exchange involving fals, according to them, some additional points need to be taken note of. In the early days of Islam, dinars and dirhams made of gold and silver were mostly used as medium of exchange in all major transactions. Only the minor ones were settled with fals. In other words, fals did not possess the characteristics of money or thamaniyya in full and was hardly used as store of value or unit of account and was more in the nature of commodity. Hence there was no restriction on purchase of the same for gold and silver on a deferred basis. The present day currencies have all the features of thaman and are meant to be thaman only. The exchange involving currencies of different countries is same as bai-sarf with difference of jins and hence, deferred settlement would lead to riba al-nasia. Dr Mohamed Nejatullah Siddiqui illustrates this possibility with an example6. He writes quotIn a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, if an individual purchases 50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), then it is highly probable that he is. in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the 50 purchased on credit at spot rate)quot Thus, sarf can be converted into interest-based borrowing amp lending. 2.1.3 Defining Thamaniyya is the Key It appears from the above synthesis of alternative views that the key issue seems to be a correct definition of thamaniyya. For instance, a fundamental question that leads to divergent positions on permissibility relates to whether thamaniyya is specific to gold and silver, or can be associated with anything that performs the functions of money. We raise some issues below which may be taken into account in any exercise in reconsideration of alternative positions. It should be appreciated that thamaniyya may not be absolute and may vary in degrees. It is true that paper currencies have completely replaced gold and silver as medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. In this sense, paper currencies can be said to possess thamaniyya. However, this is true for domestic currencies only and may not be true for foreign currencies. In other words, Indian rupees possess thamaniyya within the geographical boundaries of India only, and do not have any acceptability in US. These cannot be said to possess thamaniyya in US unless a US citizen can use Indian rupees as a medium of exchange, or unit of account, or store of value. In most cases such a possibility is remote. This possibility is also a function of the exchange rate mechanism in place, such as, convertibility of Indian rupees into US dollars, and whether a fixed or floating exchange rate system is in place. For example, assuming free convertibility of Indian rupees into US dollars and vice versa, and a fixed exchange rate system in which the rupee-dollar exchange rate is not expected to increase or decrease in the foreseeable future, thamaniyya of rupee in US is considerably improved. The example cited by Dr Nejatullah Siddiqui also appears quite robust under the circumstances. Permission to exchange rupees for dollars on a deferred basis (from one end, of course) at a rate different from the spot rate (official rate which is likely to remain fixed till the date of settlement) would be a clear case of interest-based borrowing and lending. However, if the assumption of fixed exchange rate is relaxed and the present system of fluctuating and volatile exchange rates is assumed to be the case, then it can be shown that the case of riba al-nasia breaks down. We rewrite his example: quotIn a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, if an individual purchases 50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), then it is highly probable that he is. in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the 50 purchased on credit at spot rate)quot This would be so, only if the currency risk is non-existent (exchange rate remains at 1:20), or is borne by the seller of dollars (buyer repays in rupees and not in dollars). If the former is true, then the seller of the dollars (lender) receives a predetermined return of ten percent when he converts Rs1100 received on the maturity date into 55 (at an exchange rate of 1:20). However, if the latter is true, then the return to the seller (or the lender) is not predetermined. It need not even be positive. For example, if the rupee-dollar exchange rate increases to 1:25, then the seller of dollar would receive only 44 (Rs 1100 converted into dollars) for his investment of 50. Here two points are worth noting. First, when one assumes a fixed exchange rate regime, the distinction between currencies of different countries gets diluted. The situation becomes similar to exchanging pounds with sterlings (currencies belonging to the same country) at a fixed rate. Second, when one assumes a volatile exchange rate system, then just as one can visualize lending through the foreign currency market (mechanism suggested in the above example), one can also visualize lending through any other organized market (such as, for commodities or stocks.) If one replaces dollars for stocks in the above example, it would read as: quotIn a given moment in time when the market price of stock X is Rs 20, if an individual purchases 50 stocks at the rate of Rs 22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), then it is highly probable that he is. in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the 50 stocks purchased on credit at current price)quot In this case too as in the earlier example, returns to the seller of stocks may be negative if stock price rises to Rs 25 on the settlement date. Hence, just as returns in the stock market or commodity market are Islamically acceptable because of the price risk, so are returns in the currency market because of fluctuations in the prices of currencies. A unique feature of thaman haqiqi or gold and silver is that the intrinsic worth of the currency is equal to its face value. Thus, the question of different geographical boundaries within which a given currency, such as, dinar or dirham circulates, is completely irrelevant. Gold is gold whether in country A or country B. Thus, when currency of country A made of gold is exchanged for currency of country B, also made of gold, then any deviation of the exchange rate from unity or deferment of settlement by either party cannot be permitted as it would clearly involve riba al-fadl and also riba al-nasia. However, when paper currencies of country A is exchanged for paper currency of country B, the case may be entirely different. The price risk (exchange rate risk), if positive, would eliminate any possibility of riba al-nasia in the exchange with deferred settlement. However, if price risk (exchange rate risk) is zero, then such exchange could be a source of riba al-nasia if deferred settlement is permitted7. Another point that merits serious consideration is the possibility that certain currencies may possess thamaniyya, that is, used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value globally, within the domestic as well as foreign countries. For instance, US dollar is legal tender within US it is also acceptable as a medium of exchange or unit of account for a large volume of transactions across the globe. Thus, this specific currency may be said to possesses thamaniyya globally, in which case, jurists may impose the relevant injunctions on exchanges involving this specific currency to prevent riba al-nasia. The fact is that when a currency possesses thamaniyya globally, then economic units using this global currency as the medium of exchange, unit of account or store of value may not be concerned about risk arising from volatility of inter-country exchange rates. At the same time, it should be recognized that a large majority of currencies do not perform the functions of money except within their national boundaries where these are legal tender. Riba and risk cannot coexist in the same contract. The former connotes a possibility of returns with zero risk and cannot be earned through a market with positive price risk. As has been discussed above, the possibility of riba al-fadl or riba al-nasia may arise in exchange when gold or silver function as thaman or when the exchange involves paper currencies belonging to the same country or when the exchange involves currencies of different countries following a fixed exchange rate system. The last possibility is perhaps unIslamic8 since price or exchange rate of currencies should be allowed to fluctuate freely in line with changes in demand and supply and also because prices should reflect the intrinsic worth or purchasing power of currencies. The foreign currency markets of today are characterised by volatile exchange rates. The gains or losses made on any transaction in currencies of different countries, are justified by the risk borne by the parties to the contract. 2.1.4. Possibility of Riba with Futures and Forwards So far, we have discussed views on the permissibility of bai salam in currencies, that is, when the obligation of only one of the parties to the exchange is deferred. What are the views of scholars on deferment of obligations of both parties. Typical example of such contracts are forwards and futures9. According to a large majority of scholars, this is not permissible on various grounds, the most important being the element of risk and uncertainty (gharar) and the possibility of speculation of a kind which is not permissible. This is discussed in section 3. However, another ground for rejecting such contracts may be riba prohibition. In the preceding paragraph we have discussed that bai salam in currencies with fluctuating exchange rates can not be used to earn riba because of the presence of currency risk. It is possible to demonstrate that currency risk can be hedged or reduced to zero with another forward contract transacted simultaneously. Y una vez que se elimine el riesgo, la ganancia sería claramente riba. We modify and rewrite the same example: quotIn a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, an individual purchases 50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), and the seller of dollars also hedges his position by entering into a forward contract to sell Rs1100 to be received on the future date at a rate of 1:20, then it is highly probable that he is. in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the 50 dollars purchased on credit at spot rate)quot The seller of the dollars (lender) receives a predetermined return of ten percent when he converts Rs1100 received on the maturity date into 55 dollars (at an exchange rate of 1:20) for his investment of 50 dollars irrespective of the market rate of exchange prevailing on the date of maturity. Another simple possible way to earn riba may even involve a spot transaction and a simultaneous forward transaction. For example, the individual in the above example purchases 50 on a spot basis at the rate of 1:20 and simultaneously enters into a forward contract with the same party to sell 50 at the rate of 1:21 after one month. In effect this implies that he is lending Rs1000 now to the seller of dollars for one month and earns an interest of Rs50 (he receives Rs1050 after one month. This is a typical buy-back or repo (repurchase) transaction so common in conventional banking.10 3. The Issue of Freedom from Gharar Gharar, unlike riba, does not have a consensus definition. In broad terms, it connotes risk and uncertainty. It is useful to view gharar as a continuum of risk and uncertainty wherein the extreme point of zero risk is the only point that is well-defined. Beyond this point, gharar becomes a variable and the gharar involved in a real life contract would lie somewhere on this continuum. Beyond a point on this continuum, risk and uncertainty or gharar becomes unacceptable11. Jurists have attempted to identify such situations involving forbidden gharar. A major factor that contributes to gharar is inadequate information (jahl) which increases uncertainty. This is when the terms of exchange, such as, price, objects of exchange, time of settlement etc. are not well-defined. Gharar is also defined in terms of settlement risk or the uncertainty surrounding delivery of the exchanged articles. Islamic scholars have identified the conditions which make a contract uncertain to the extent that it is forbidden. Each party to the contract must be clear as to the quantity, specification, price, time, and place of delivery of the contract. A contract, say, to sell fish in the river involves uncertainty about the subject of exchange, about its delivery, and hence, not Islamically permissible. The need to eliminate any element of uncertainty inherent in a contract is underscored by a number of traditions.12 An outcome of excessive gharar or uncertainty is that it leads to the possibility of speculation of a variety which is forbidden. Speculation in its worst form, is gambling. The holy Quran and the traditions of the holy prophet explicitly prohibit gains made from games of chance which involve unearned income. The term used for gambling is maisir which literally means getting something too easily, getting a profit without working for it. Apart from pure games of chance, the holy prophet also forbade actions which generated unearned incomes without much productive efforts.13 Here it may be noted that the term speculation has different connotations. It always involves an attempt to predict the future outcome of an event. But the process may or may not be backed by collection, analysis and interpretation of relevant information. The former case is very much in conformity with Islamic rationality. Una unidad económica islámica se requiere para asumir el riesgo después de hacer una evaluación adecuada del riesgo con la ayuda de la información. All business decisions involve speculation in this sense. It is only in the absence of information or under conditions of excessive gharar or uncertainty that speculation is akin to a game of chance and is reprehensible. 3.2 Gharar amp Speculation with of Futures amp Forwards Considering the case of the basic exchange contracts highlighted in section 1, it may be noted that the third type of contract where settlement by both the parties is deferred to a future date is forbidden, according to a large majority of jurists on grounds of excessive gharar. Futures and forwards in currencies are examples of such contracts under which two parties become obliged to exchange currencies of two different countries at a known rate at the end of a known time period. For example, individuals A and B commit to exchange US dollars and Indian rupees at the rate of 1: 22 after one month. If the amount involved is 50 and A is the buyer of dollars then, the obligations of A and B are to make a payments of Rs1100 and 50 respectively at the end of one month. The contract is settled when both the parties honour their obligations on the future date. Traditionally, an overwhelming majority of Sharia scholars have disapproved such contracts on several grounds. The prohibition applies to all such contracts where the obligations of both parties are deferred to a future date, including contracts involving exchange of currencies. An important objection is that such a contract involves sale of a non-existent object or of an object not in the possession of the seller. This objection is based on several traditions of the holy prophet.14 There is difference of opinion on whether the prohibition in the said traditions apply to foodstuffs, or perishable commodities or to all objects of sale. There is, however, a general agreement on the view that the efficient cause (illa) of the prohibition of sale of an object which the seller does not own or of sale prior to taking possession is gharar, or the possible failure to deliver the goods purchased. Is this efficient cause (illa) present in an exchange involving future contracts in currencies of different countries. In a market with full and free convertibility or no constraints on the supply of currencies, the probability of failure to deliver the same on the maturity date should be no cause for concern. Further, the standardized nature of futures contracts and transparent operating procedures on the organized futures markets15 is believed to minimize this probability. Some recent scholars have opined in the light of the above that futures, in general, should be permissible. According to them, the efficient cause (illa), that is, the probability of failure to deliver was quite relevant in a simple, primitive and unorganized market. It is no longer relevant in the organized futures markets of today16. Such contention, however, continues to be rejected by the majority of scholars. They underscore the fact that futures contracts almost never involve delivery by both parties. On the contrary, parties to the contract reverse the transaction and the contract is settled in price difference only. For example, in the above example, if the currency exchange rate changes to 1: 23 on the maturity date, the reverse transaction for individual A would mean selling 50 at the rate of 1:23 to individual B. This would imply A making a gain of Rs50 (the difference between Rs1150 and Rs1100). This is exactly what B would lose. It may so happen that the exchange rate would change to 1:21 in which case A would lose Rs50 which is what B would gain. This obviously is a zero-sum game in which the gain of one party is exactly equal to the loss of the other. This possibility of gains or losses (which theoretically can touch infinity) encourages economic units to speculate on the future direction of exchange rates. Since exchange rates fluctuate randomly, gains and losses are random too and the game is reduced to a game of chance. There is a vast body of literature on the forecastability of exchange rates and a large majority of empirical studies have provided supporting evidence on the futility of any attempt to make short-run predictions. Exchange rates are volatile and remain unpredictable at least for the large majority of market participants. Needless to say, any attempt to speculate in the hope of the theoretically infinite gains is, in all likelihood, a game of chance for such participants. While the gains, if they materialize, are in the nature of maisir or unearned gains, the possibility of equally massive losses do indicate a possibility of default by the loser and hence, gharar. 3.3. Risk Management in Volatile Markets Hedging or risk reduction adds to planning and managerial efficiency. The economic justification of futures and forwards is in term of their role as a device for hedging. In the context of currency markets which are characterized by volatile rates, such contracts are believed to enable the parties to transfer and eliminate risk arising out of such fluctuations. For example, modifying the earlier example, assume that individual A is an exporter from India to US who has already sold some commodities to B, the US importer and anticipates a cashflow of 50 (which at the current market rate of 1:22 mean Rs 1100 to him) after one month. There is a possibility that US dollar may depreciate against Indian rupee during these one month, in which case A would realize less amount of rupees for his 50 ( if the new rate is 1:21, A would realize only Rs1050 ). Hence, A may enter into a forward or future contract to sell 50 at the rate of 1:21.5 at the end of one month (and thereby, realize Rs1075) with any counterparty which, in all probability, would have diametrically opposite expectations regarding future direction of exchange rates. In this case, A is able to hedge his position and at the same time, forgoes the opportunity of making a gain if his expectations do not materialize and US dollar appreciates against Indian rupee (say, to 1:23 which implies that he would have realized Rs1150, and not Rs1075 which he would realize now.) While hedging tools always improve planning and hence, performance, it should be noted that the intention of the contracting party - whether to hedge or to speculate, can never be ascertained. It may be noted that hedging can also be accomplished with bai salam in currencies. As in the above example, exporter A anticipating a cash inflow of 50 after one month and expecting a depreciation of dollar may go for a salam sale of 50 (with his obligation to pay 50 deferred by one month.) Since he is expecting a dollar depreciation, he may agree to sell 50 at the rate of 1: 21.5. There would be an immediate cash inflow in Rs 1075 for him. The question may be, why should the counterparty pay him rupees now in lieu of a promise to be repaid in dollars after one month. As in the case of futures, the counterparty would do so for profit, if its expectations are diametrically opposite, that is, it expects dollar to appreciate. For example, if dollar appreciates to 1: 23 during the one month period, then it would receive Rs1150 for Rs 1075 it invested in the purchase of 50. Thus, while A is able to hedge its position, the counterparty is able to earn a profit on trading of currencies. The difference from the earlier scenario is that the counterparty would be more restrained in trading because of the investment required, and such trading is unlikely to take the shape of rampant speculation. 4. Summary amp Conclusion Currency markets of today are characterized by volatile exchange rates. This fact should be taken note of in any analysis of the three basic types of contracts in which the basis of distinction is the possibility of deferment of obligations to future. We have attempted an assessment of these forms of contracting in terms of the overwhelming need to eliminate any possibility of riba, minimize gharar, jahl and the possibility of speculation of a kind akin to games of chance. En un mercado volátil, los participantes están expuestos al riesgo de cambio y la racionalidad islámica requiere que dicho riesgo se minimice en interés de la eficiencia si no se reduce a cero. It is obvious that spot settlement of the obligations of both parties would completely prohibit riba, and gharar, and minimize the possibility of speculation. However, this would also imply the absence of any technique of risk management and may involve some practical problems for the participants. At the other extreme, if the obligations of both the parties are deferred to a future date, then such contracting, in all likelihood, would open up the possibility of infinite unearned gains and losses from what may be rightly termed for the majority of participants as games of chance. Of course, these would also enable the participants to manage risk through complete risk transfer to others and reduce risk to zero. It is this possibility of risk reduction to zero which may enable a participant to earn riba. Future is not a new form of contract. Rather the justification for proscribing it is new. If in a simple primitive economy, it was prevention of gharar relating to delivery of the exchanged article, in todays39 complex financial system and organized exchanges, it is prevention of speculation of kind which is unIslamic and which is possible under excessive gharar involved in forecasting highly volatile exchange rates. Such speculation is not just a possibility, but a reality. El motivo exacto de una unidad económica que entra en un futuro contrato - la especulación o la cobertura puede no ser determinable (los reguladores pueden monitorear el uso final, pero tal regulación puede no ser muy práctica ni efectiva en un mercado libre). Empirical evidence at a macro level, however, indicates the former to be the dominant motive. The second type of contracting with deferment of obligations of one of the parties to a future date falls between the two extremes. While Sharia scholars have divergent views about its permissibility, our analysis reveals that there is no possibility of earning riba with this kind of contracting. The requirement of spot settlement of obligations of atleast one party imposes a natural curb on speculation, though the room for speculation is greater than under the first form of contracting. The requirement amounts to imposition of a hundred percent margin which, in all probability, would drive away the uninformed speculator from the market. This should force the speculator to be a little more sure of his expectations by being more informed. When speculation is based on information it is not only permissible, but desirable too. Bai salam would also enable the participants to manage risk. At the same time, the requirement of settlement from one end would dampen the tendency of many participants to seek a complete transfer of perceived risk and encourage them to make a realistic assessment of the actual risk. Notes amp References 1. These diverse views are reflected in the papers presented at the Fourth Fiqh Seminar organized by the Islamic Fiqh Academy, India in 1991 which were subsequently published in Majalla Fiqh Islami, part 4 by the Academy. The discussion on riba prohibition draws on these views. 2. Nabil Saleh, Unlawful gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, Graham and Trotman, London, 1992, p.16 3. Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni, vol.4, pp.5-9 4. Shams al Din al Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, vol 14, pp 24-25 5. Paper presented by Abdul Azim Islahi at the Fourth Fiqh Seminar organized by Islamic Fiqh Academy, India in 1991. 6. Paper by Dr M N Siddiqui highlighting the issue was circulated among all leading Fiqh scholars by the Islamic Fiqh Academy, India for their views and was the main theme of deliberations during the session on Currency Exchange at the Fourth Fiqh Seminar held in 1991. 7. It is contended by some that the above example may be modified to show the possibility of riba with spot settlement too. quotIn a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, if an individual purchases 50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation also on a spot basis), then it amounts to the seller of dollars exchanging 50 with 55 on a spot basis (Since, he can obtain Rs 1100 now, exchange them for 55 at spot rate of 1:20)quot Thus, spot settlement can also be a clear source of riba. Does this imply that spot settlement should be proscribed too. The fallacy in the above and earlier examples is that there is no single contract but multiple contracts of exchange occurring at different points in time (true even in the above case). Riba can be earned only when the spot rate of 1:20 is fixed during the time interval between the transactions. This assumption is, needless to say, unrealistic and if imposed artificially, perhaps unIslamic. 8. Islam envisages a free market where prices are determined by forces of demand and supply. There should be no interference in the price formation process even by the regulators. While price control and fixation is generally accepted as unIslamic, some scholars, such as, Ibn Taimiya do admit of its permissibility. However, such permissibility is subject to the condition that price fixation is intended to combat cases of market anomalies caused by impairing the conditions of free competition. If market conditions are normal, forces of demand and supply should be allowed a free play in determination of prices. 9. Some Islamic scholars use the term forward to connote a salam sale. However, we use this term in the conventional sense where the obligations of both parties are deferred to a future date and hence, are similar to futures in this sense. The latter however, are standardized contracts and are traded on an organized Futures Exchange while the former are specific to the requirements of the buyer and seller. 10. This is known as bai al inah which is considered forbidden by almost all scholars with the exception of Imam Shafii. Followers of the same school, such as Al Nawawi do not consider it Islamically permissible. 11. It should be noted that modern finance theories also distinguish between conditions of risk and uncertainty and assert that rational decision making is possible only under conditions of risk and not under conditions of uncertainty. Conditions of risk refer to a situation where it is possible with the help of available data to estimate all possible outcomes and their corresponding probabilities, or develop the ex-ante probability distribution. Under conditions of uncertainty, no such exercise is possible. The definition of gharar, Real-life situations, of course, fall somewhere in the continuum of risk and uncertainty. 12. The following traditions underscore the need to avoid contracts involving uncertainty. Ibn Abbas reported that when Allah39s prophet (pbuh) came to Medina, they were paying one and two years advance for fruits, so he said: quotThose who pay in advance for any thing must do so for a specified weight and for a definite timequot. It is reported on the authority of Ibn Umar that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) forbade the transaction called habal al-habala whereby a man bought a she-camel which was to be the off-spring of a she-camel and which was still in its mother39s womb. 13. According to a tradition reported by Abu Huraira, Allah39s Messenger (pbuh) forbade a transaction determined by throwing stones, and the type which involves some uncertainty. The form of gambling most popular to Arabs was gambling by casting lots by means of arrows, on the principle of lottery, for division of carcass of slaughtered animals. The carcass was divided into unequal parts and marked arrows were drawn from a bag. One received a large or small share depending on the mark on the arrow drawn. Obviously it was a pure game of chance. 14. The holy prophet is reported to have said quot Do not sell what is not with youquot Ibn Abbas reported that the prophet said: quotHe who buys foodstuff should not sell it until he has taken possession of it. quot Ibn Abbas said: quotI think it applies to all other things as wellquot. 15. The Futures Exchange performs an important function of providing a guarantee for delivery by all parties to the contract. It serves as the counterparty in the exchange for both, that is, as the buyer for the sale and as the seller for the purchase. 16. M Hashim Kamali quotIslamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futuresquot, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol.13, no.2, 1996 Send Your Comments to: Dr Mohammed Obaidullah, Xavier Institute of Management, Bhubaneswar 751 013, India Mail to: obeidximb. stpbh. soft. net Add this page to your favorite Social Bookmarking websites More.
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